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V. What behind-the-border reforms in services and investment




What  behind-the-border  reforms in  services  and  investment  are  best  done  through
trade agreements? One way to answer this question is to think of trade agreements as being
exercises in piecemeal reform, in the sense that they provide opportunities for reform, but in a
constrained, partial manner. The key policy question is whether countries should unreservedly
take advantage of these opportunities, despite the constraints, or whether the nature of the
constraints should temper the way in which they go about the reforms.
The  key  policy  dilemma  originates  in  the  theory  of  the  second  best.  Lipsey  and
Lancaster (1956) noted that if, for institutional or other reasons, one of the conditions for
economic  efficiency  cannot  be  achieved,  then  the  other  conditions  may  no  longer  be
desirable. Their definition of piecemeal policy was a situation where it was still a “second
best” optimal to achieve the other conditions, even though the best could not be achieved.
Examples  of  papers  that  have  tried  to  characterize  piecemeal  second-best  policy  include
Davis and Whinston (1965) and Boadway and Harris (1977).
In the context of goods trade, the principles of piecemeal reform are well understood.
The economic cost of a tariff is a function, not just of the average level of tariff, but also of its
dispersion.  So  a  key  guiding  principle  of  piecemeal  tariff  reform  is  that  it  should  not
exacerbate  the  dispersion.  Otherwise,  partial  reform  may  actually  worsen  economic  well-
being. In his seminal analysis, Corden (1971 and 1974) therefore examined options such as
the “concertina” method – where high tariffs would be squeezed down to medium levels at
the first stage, then these and the existing medium tariffs would be squeezed down to a lower
level and “across-the-board” reductions – where each year, all tariffs would be reduced by an
equal percentage.
This guiding principle is now sufficiently well-accepted in trade negotiating circles
that it has been embodied in a negotiating modality. In the current round of non-agricultural
market access negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), tariff cuts will take
place according to the so-called Swiss formula, which ensures that within each country the
highest  tariffs  will  undergo  the  greatest  percentage  cuts.  According  to  this “ops  down”
formula, the partial reform achieved via the negotiations will reduce both the average level of
tariffs and their dispersion.
1 An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was  presented  to  ESCAP  conference  on  ‘Emerging  Trade  Issues  for
Policymakers in Developing Countries of Asia and the Pacific: New Era of Trade Governance’, Manila, 4-6
March 2009.94
The aim of this paper is to explore whether there are principles that can be brought to
bear in negotiating the services and investment provisions of trade agreements, and which can
help to ensure that the partial reforms achieved under those agreements add to, rather than
detract  from  economic  well-being.  These  principles  might  be  seen  as  the  services  and
investment equivalents of the “top-down” principle for tariff reform. It is not intended to go
as  far  as  developing  a  negotiating  modality  for  services  or  investment,  as that  would  be
premature. However, the principles developed here could be used by individual countries on a
voluntary basis when undertaking negotiations in services and investment.
There are two possible levels of analysis. One is to compare trade agreements to other
modes of liberalization, as exercises in piecemeal reform. Should countries embrace trade
agreements  in  services  and  investment  whenever  the  opportunity  arises,  even  though  the
liberalization achieved under them is likely to be constrained in various ways? Or should
countries watch for instances when trade agreements might make things worse?
The  second  level  of  analysis  is  to  consider  which  particular  reforms  should  be
included in trade agreements (the question posed in the title of this paper). Should countries
negotiate whatever they can within trade agreements? Or should they  worry  about which
reforms will avoid losses and/or deliver the biggest gains? The paper proceeds with those two
levels of analysis in turn.
A. Trade agreements versus other modes of liberalization
2
Trade agreements can be either multilateral or preferential, but they typically involve
the reciprocal exchange of trade concessions with one or more trading partners. They stand in
contrast to unilateral liberalization, where a country “goes it alone”.
In the context of goods trade, the benefits of reciprocity are clearly understood. The
key economic benefit is that reciprocity helps to neutralize the negative terms of trade effects
of unilateral tariff reform (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). It is also argued that reciprocity
helps with the political economy of tariff reform – the benefits to exporting interests from a
trading partner’s concessions can be offset against the losses to import-competing interests
from a country’s own concessions (e.g., Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008).
In  the  case  of  services  and  investment,  the  benefits  of  reciprocity  for  either  the
economics  or  the  political  economy  of  reform  have  yet  to  be  established.  This  section
explores  these  issues;  however,  it  must first  be established  exactly  what  types  of  partial
reforms trade agreements can be expected to achieve in services and investment.
As noted recently (Dee and Findlay, 2009), there are at least four ways to define and
evaluate the services and investment provisions of trade agreements:
(a) Evaluate the rules;
(b) Evaluate the commitments made under those rules;
2 Parts of this section draw on Dee and Findlay, 2009.95
(c) Evaluate the extent to which the commitments constrain or change the status quo,
given that there can be large gaps between bound and applied protection in the
areas of both services and investment;
(d) Evaluate whether any change to the status quo has economic significance.
1. Evaluating the rules
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under WTO imposes one key
discipline on all services trade – the most-favoured nation obligation. This requires a country
to treat the services suppliers of all other countries equally. There is to be no discrimination
among the various different foreign sources of services.
Beyond that, there are two other key disciplines that apply on a positive list basis, i.e.,
they  only  apply  to  selected  services  sectors  that  a  country  chooses  to  subject  to  those
disciplines. The first is a national treatment obligation. This requires a country to treat the
services suppliers of all other countries the same as its domestic suppliers. There is to be no
discrimination  between  domestic  and  foreign  suppliers.  The  second  is  a  market  access
obligation. This requires a country to refrain from applying six specific types of quantitative
restrictions on services suppliers, be they domestic or foreign suppliers. For example, there is
to be no limit on the number of services suppliers or on the value of services transactions.
GATS  recognizes  the  right  of  individual  governments  to  regulate.  Non-economic
objectives  can  be  pursued,  for  example,  through  universal  service  obligations.  Services
provided  by  governments  are  quarantined. However,  GATS  also  requires  that  domestic
regulatory regimes be the “least burdensome” necessary to achieve their objectives. Although
this provides a further WTO discipline on non-discriminatory measures that fall outside of the
narrow  scope  of  GATS “market  access”  commitments,  the  discipline  is  rather  loose,
especially  since  the  definition  of “least  burdensome”  has  yet  to  be  decided on by  WTO
members.
The presumption exists that the services provisions of preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) will be GATS-plus. That is, they will impose rules at least as liberal as those of
GATS, and impose them on at least as many sectors. In part, this presumption is written into
GATS itself. For the services provisions of PTAs to be WTO-consistent, they need to have
substantial sectoral coverage, and provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of the national treatment obligation. However, it should be noted
that there is no WTO requirement for PTAs to address non-discriminatory market access
limitations, or to address domestic regulation. In fact, enforcing WTO consistency has proved
no easier in services than it has in goods.
In practice, when PTAs have included services provisions, they have tended to be of
two  types.  GATS-style  agreements  have  included  national  treatment  and  market  access
obligations for services on a positive list basis, and have included investment provisions only
via the treatment of commercial presence in the services sector. In contrast, North American
Free  Trade  Agreement-style pacts have  included  national  treatment  and  market  access
obligations for services on a negative list basis. That is, the obligations apply to all services96
sectors, except those nominated for exclusion in an annex of reservations and exceptions;
they have typically included a separate chapter on investment that imposes most-favoured
nation  and  national  treatment  obligations  on  investment  in  all  sectors  (again,  subject  to
reservations and exceptions), not just in services.
Several recent studies have compared the rules established under PTAs to those of the
GATS (e.g., Marchetti and Roy, 2008; Dee and Findlay 2009). They have shown that in many
dimensions, PTAs are not as liberal on average as WTO agreements. This is in part because
some PTAs have no substantive services provisions at all – only a minority of the agreements
between developing countries have such provisions. It is also because many PTAs are silent
on issues such as domestic regulation, monopolies, private business practices, safeguards and
subsidies. These are not areas where PTAs have forged ahead of WTO disciplines. However,
on the two core issues of market access and national treatment, PTAs are now more liberal on
average than WTO. This is largely because of the growing list of agreements that include
these disciplines on a negative list rather than a positive list basis.
2. Evaluating the commitments
On commitments, Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) and Marchetti and Roy (2008) find
that PTAs tend to go significantly beyond GATS offers under the Doha Round, in terms of
improved  and  new  bindings.  Further,  the  proportion  of  new/improved  commitments  is
generally much greater in PTAs (compared with GATS offers) than in GATS offers (when
compared with  existing  GATS  commitments).  Some  countries  are  described  as  showing
spectacular improvements in their PTA commitments. Among them are countries that have
signed a PTA with the United States. On average, these now have mode 1 (cross-border) and
mode 3 (commercial presence) commitments in more than 80 per cent of services subsectors,
compared with  commitments  in  less  than  half  of  the  services  subsectors  in  their  GATS
schedules/offers.
In  most  cases  where  PTA  commitments  improve  on  WTO  commitments,  it  is
primarily  through  new  bindings  rather  than  through  improvements  on  existing  bindings.
Arguably, though, the commitments are more likely to imply real liberalization in the latter
case than in the former. Exceptions to the general trend include China and India, whose PTA
commitments (China with Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, and India with Singapore)
tend  to  take  the  form  of  improvements  to  sectors  already  committed  under  GATS
schedules/offers rather than new bindings, and are mostly limited to mode 3 (commercial
presence).
Finally, the above authors note that PTAs provide for advances both for sectors that
tended to attract fewer offers in the GATS (e.g., audiovisual, road, rail and postal-courier) as
well as for sectors that were already popular targets for GATS offers (e.g., professional and
financial services). One exception is health services, where PTA commitments do not appear
to go significantly beyond GATS offers.
Overall,  Roy,  Marchetti  and  Lim  (2006)  concluded  that  “PTAs  generally  have
provided for significant improvements over GATS commitments, sometimes even leading to97
real liberalization of the market.
3. Evaluating the extent of real liberalization
In a recent exercise, Barth and others (2006) compared regulatory practice with actual
WTO commitments in the financial sector for 123 WTO members. They found significant
differences between commitments and actual practice. Some of their examples are:
(a) More than 30 WTO members that prohibit foreign firms from entering through
acquisitions, subsidiaries or branches in their WTO schedules allow such entry in
practice;
(b) Six WTO members do not allow foreign entry through subsidiaries or branches,
even though in their schedules they indicated they do. This anomaly may reflect
the “prudential carve  out”  in GATS,  whereby  members  are  not  required  to
schedule  limitations  maintained  for  prudential  purposes.  However,  it  is  highly
questionable whether bans on foreign entry could be defended as purely prudential
measures;
(c) A large number of WTO members prohibit banks from engaging in insurance or
securities activities in their schedules, but allow such activities in practice;
(d) Twenty-six  WTO members  in  practice  set  the  same  minimal  capital  entry
requirements for domestic and foreign banks, even though in their schedules they
do not commit to such non-discriminatory treatment.
Barth  and  others  (2006) also  looked  for  evidence  of  statistically  significant
correlations between WTO commitments and regulatory practice.  Even if the two do not
match exactly, they expect the correlation to be positive. However, their finding did not bear
this out:
“The  results…indicate  that,  on  average,  countries  are  more  open  based  on
actual  practice  than  their  WTO  commitments.  The  difference  in  means
between  actual  practice  and  commitments,  moreover,  is  statistically
significant. Also, there is no significant correlation between actual practice
and commitments. These results hold for developing countries and countries
with more than 2 million people, but not for the developed countries. The
latter group of countries is, on average, less open based upon actual practice
than commitments.”
This last, rather explosive finding passes without further comment!
As evidence about whether PTAs promote real liberalization, the findings are merely
circumstantial. However, if WTO commitments lag in actual practice by a significant margin,
then even if PTAs improve significantly on WTO commitments they may still themselves lag
in actual practice.
Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) also attempted to assess whether PTA commitments
led to real liberalization. They did not make direct comparisons with regulatory practice, but98
looked for instances where PTA commitments were phased in over time, using the phasing
mechanism as an indication that real liberalization is taking place. They noted that the group
of countries making such phased commitments was fairly widespread, although it appeared
that  financial  services  and  telecommunications  dominated.  Most  phase-out  commitments
have been contracted by countries as part of a PTA with the United States, although not
exclusively.
Certainly,  the  PTA  experience  with  partners  other  than  the United  States  can  be
dramatically  different.  It  is  widely  recognized  that  in  the Association  of  Southeast  Asian
Nations (ASEAN) members, WTO commitments and PTA commitments can lag in actual
practice by a considerable margin (e.g., Stephenson and Nikomborirak, 2002). In fact, one of
the recent PTAs that contains no services commitments whatsoever is that between ASEAN
and China.
4. Evaluating the economic significance of real liberalization
Dee (2007) argued the following three propositions:
(a) When real liberalization of services and investment occurs in trade agreements, it
tends to involve the removal of discrimination against foreigners;
(b) In PTAs, this tends to be on a preferential basis, i.e., only for the particular partner
country;
(c) Therefore,  when  real  liberalization  of  services  and  investment  occurs  in  trade
agreements,  it  tends  not  to  involve  the  liberalization  of  restrictions  that  affect
domestic and foreign players equally.
This  is  despite  the  fact  that  GATS  specifically  recognizes  certain  types  of  non-
discriminatory restrictions on market access, and imposes weaker disciplines on other non-
discriminatory  restrictions  through  its  provisions  on  domestic  regulation.  This  chapter
outlines a number of reasons for these outcomes.
Some of the reasons are reflected in the attitude of trade negotiators. Two statements
often heard from trade negotiators are that they “do not want to give away negotiating coin”
and that “they are not in the business of negotiating on behalf of other countries”. This latter
sentiment, in particular, places the imperative on ensuring that trade concessions in PTAs are
restricted to being preferential, even when economic arguments suggest that a country could
gain more from making them on a non-preferential basis.
With an imperative for PTA concessions to be preferential, this often dictates that the
concessions need to target measures that explicitly discriminate against foreigners. This is
because, in many cases, the only provisions that can feasibly be liberalized on a preferential
basis are those that discriminate against foreigners. Furthermore, as noted, the requirements
for WTO consistency only require PTAs to remove limitations on national treatment. They do
not require them to address issues of market access or domestic regulation.
Another statement heard from trade negotiators is that they will only commit to things99
that  their  country  was  planning  to  do  anyway.  According  to  this  imperative,  when
commitments are made that affect domestic services providers as well as foreigners, they tend
to involve no real liberalization that would not have taken place anyway. For example, Roy,
Marchetti and Lim (2006) noted that the United States always lodged a broad exception for
the market access obligation in its PTAs whose purpose was to ensure that those PTAs did
not go beyond its market access obligations under GATS.
Other reasons for the above outcomes are reflected in the attitudes of a country’s
trading partners. Under the request-and-offer negotiating modality (which is currently being
used  in  the  Doha  negotiations  on  services,  and  is  the  means  by  which  many  PTAs  are
negotiated), countries are asked to contemplate, not just reforms that are in their own best
interests, but also reforms that are in their trading partners’ best interests. It will tend to be in
a trading partner’s best interests to target only those provisions that explicitly discriminate
against foreigners – in that way, the foreign market share is maximized. Foreign producers
would generally have little interest in unleashing competition from promising domestic new
entrants. They would rather join a cartel on a far more selective basis! Even if the preference
they  receive  is  eventually  eroded  by  other  agreements,  they  will  receive  a  first-mover
advantage that can confer a permanent benefit, particularly when establishing in the market
involves sunk costs (Mattoo and Fink, 2002).
The above observations define the way in which trade agreements in services and
investment tend to be constrained. The economic significance of the constraints comes from
observing that different types of services trade restrictions can have different kinds of effects.
Some  regulatory  trade  restrictions,  particularly  quantitative  restrictions,  create
artificial scarcity. The prices of services are inflated, not because the real resource cost of
producing them has gone up, but because incumbent firms are able to earn economic rents
(excess profits) – akin to a tax, but with the revenue flowing to the incumbent rather than to
government.  Liberalization  of  these  barriers  would  not  only  yield  relatively  small  gains
associated with better resource allocation, it would also have redistributive effects associated
with the elimination of rents to incumbents. Such rent-creating restrictions are tariff-like, with
the redistribution of rent having effects similar to the redistribution of tariff revenue.
Alternatively, services trade restrictions could increase the real resource cost of doing
business. An example would be a requirement for foreign service professionals to retrain in a
new  economy,  rather  than  to  pass  an  accreditation  process.  Liberalization  would  be
equivalent to a productivity improvement (saving in real resources), and yield relatively large
gains. This could increase returns for the incumbent service providers as well as lower costs
for users elsewhere in the economy.
This distinction has two important implications. First, the gains from liberalizing cost-
escalating barriers are likely to exceed the gains from liberalizing rent-creating barriers by a
significant margin. Second, in the context of PTAs, the danger of net welfare losses from net
trade diversion arises if the relevant barriers are rent-creating, since rent distribution can have
the same effects as tariff redistribution (see also Pomfret, 1997).100
So  the  key  to  establishing  the  economic  significance  of  any  real  services  trade
liberalization achieved in trade agreements is to establish whether it targets trade barriers that
create rents or raise costs.
As noted above, the barriers that are easiest to liberalize on a preferential basis are
explicit quantitative restrictions. These create artificial scarcity, and hence tend to generate
rents. For example, one popular target for liberalization in PTAs has been barriers in banking
and telecommunications. The limited empirical evidence suggests that in these sectors (where
explicit barriers to entry are rife), barriers appear to create rents. In distribution services,
where indirect trade restrictions also apply, barriers appear to increase costs. In air passenger
transport and the professions, barriers appear to have both effects.
In particular, discriminatory barriers in the professions appear to create rents, while
the non-discriminatory restrictions (such as restrictions that require partnerships, and require
both  the  investors  and  managers  of  professional  firms  to  themselves  be  licensed
professionals)  increase  costs (Gregan  and  Johnson, 1999;  Kalirajan and  others, 2000;
Kalirajan, 2000;  Nguyen-Hong, 2000; Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and
Development, 2005;  and  Copenhagen  Economics, 2005). In  addition, theoretical  arguments
suggest that barriers in maritime and electricity generation primarily affect costs (Steiner, 2000; and
Clark, Dollar and Micco, 2004).
Dee (2007) showed that if an East Asian PTA managed to eliminate all discrimination
against foreigners in the sectors where empirical evidence was available, the gains would be
small  compared  to  a  moderately  successful  completion  of  the  Doha  Round. In  fact,  they
would be trivial compared to a comprehensive programme of unilateral regulatory reform that
instead  targeted  non-discriminatory,  behind-the-border  restrictions  on  competition.  The
reason is that there appears to be a reasonably strong correlation in practice between measures
that discriminate against foreigners and measures that create rents.
Thus,  those  who  have  evaluated  the  services  and  investment  provisions  of  trade
agreements according to their rules or commitments have tended to see “doughnuts”. Those
who have evaluated them according to whether they create any real, significant liberalization
have tended to see “holes”.
5. Whether to enter trade negotiations – principles of piecemeal reform
The above discussion suggests that for both PTAs and multilateral agreements, there
are reasons to be cautious about the size of the potential gains. In both cases, there are also
situations where the trade agreements could make things worse.
In the case of PTAs, the problem is that if concessions are made to a particular foreign
trading partner, prior to removing non-discriminatory distortions and ensuring the general
contestability of the market, then the  concessions simply risk handing  monopoly rents to
foreigners. Furthermore, if the new trading partner has to incur sunk costs to enter the market,
then a country risks landing itself permanently with a second-class supplier who is difficult to
budge (see also Dee and Findlay, 2008; and Marchetti and Roy, 2008).101
Multilateral trade agreements can avoid some of these problems by opening a market
to  many  foreign  players  simultaneously. However, this  does  not  mean  that  they  are
completely without problems.
At best, removing discrimination against all foreign suppliers simultaneously will not
be sufficient to ensure the full benefits of market opening. It is useful to draw a comparison
with the theory of  goods trade. When  goods  are homogeneous  and domestic and foreign
varieties are perfect substitutes, removing all discrimination against foreign suppliers will be
sufficient to ensure that the country can access goods at the lowest possible price (in this case,
“the”  world price), even if domestic suppliers  are still penalized by domestic distortions.
However, services are typically highly differentiated, often being tailored to the needs of
individual customers. In this case, simply removing discrimination against foreign suppliers
will not be sufficient to ensure that a country can access goods at the lowest possible price. If
domestic suppliers are still penalized by distortions, the prices of their services will remain
too high, despite the foreign competition. The empirical analysis by Dee (2007) suggested
that this latter problem could be highly significant in practice.
At worst, removing discrimination against all foreign suppliers simultaneously can
move  a  country’s  resource  allocation  in  the  wrong  direction,  risking  an  adverse  overall
economic outcome. If domestic suppliers are subject to domestic regulatory impediments, the
resources  devoted  to  domestic  supply  will  be  too  small,  and  in  a  first-best  situation,  the
domestic  sector  should  be  bigger.  However,  subjecting  the  sector  to  more  foreign
competition, while keeping it subjected to its own domestic regulatory impediments, will tend
to make the sector shrink rather than grow – domestic resource allocation is thus moved in the
wrong direction. This has the potential to make economic well-being worse (depending on
whether the sector is a general equilibrium substitute to complement to other sectors in the
economy) (see also Dee, Hardin and Holmes, 2000).
Not only is this a potentially bad economic outcome, it is also a poor outcome in terms
of domestic political economy. Potential domestic new entrants are a key group likely to be in
favour of reform. Failure to lift the domestic regulatory impediments that hold them back
therefore misses an opportunity to mobilize them as part of the pro-reform coalition.
To the extent that both PTAs and multilateral trade agreements focus on barriers to
services trade and investment that create rents rather than raise costs, they both represent poor
political  economy  in  another  sense.  Often,  the  essence  of  barriers  to  services  trade  and
investment  is  that  they  serve  to  protect  incumbent  service  providers  from  any  new
competition, be it from domestic players or foreigners. Thus, incumbent service providers are
often the most vociferous opponents of reform. Yet trade reforms that manage to lower cost
structures have the potential to benefit even the incumbent service providers. Failure to lift
the domestic regulatory impediments that hold them back misses an important opportunity to
mobilize incumbents as part of the pro-reform coalition.
Indeed, the politics of regulatory reform is often the politics of incumbent versus a
range of opposing interests – not just potential new entrants (either domestic or foreign), but
also upstream supplying industries, downstream using industries, consumers and, sometimes,102
even  governments.  Most  of  the  protagonists  are  domestic.  Trade  negotiations  are  forums
where the politics is domestic versus foreign. They are not forums that can mobilize the full
range of domestic pro-reform interests.
The case for reciprocity in services and investment
In  this  regard,  international  reciprocity  does  not  help  greatly  with  the  political
economy of trade reform in services and investment. This is because the politics is primarily
one of competing domestic interests, not domestic versus foreign interests (Dee and Findlay,
2008).
Furthermore, international reciprocity does not help greatly with the economics of
trade reform in services and investment. In goods trade, the adverse terms of trade effects
occur because goods trade barriers operate at the border. However, the regulatory barriers to
services and investment are primarily behind-the-border barriers, and their first-round effects
are primarily on domestic prices and costs. If unilateral trade liberalization has any impact on
the  terms  of  trade  at  all,  it  can  often  be  positive  rather  than  negative,  particularly  if  the
liberalization removes barriers that raise domestic costs. Thus, there are no benefits from
reciprocity within services, as there are no adverse terms of trade effects to be neutralized
(Dee and Findlay, 2008).
Nor are there likely to be significant benefits from reciprocity across sectors. One
reason is that the most intensive users of services are often other services sectors. So the
domestic benefits of services reform often flow to other services sectors, not to manufacturing
or agriculture (for more details, see Dee and Findlay, 2008).
B. What to liberalize within trade agreements
Trade agreements may nevertheless provide useful venues to lock in certain types of
reforms, despite all the qualifications noted above. A second key question is what types of
reforms are best done within trade agreements.
An important first step, however, is to recognize how trade barriers in services and
investment  may  interact  with  legitimate  domestic  regulation.  This  interaction  can  set
additional limits on the extent of trade liberalization.
1. Limits to liberalization
3
In many services sectors, there are legitimate reasons for domestic regulation. For
example, a key reason for prudential regulation in banking and insurance markets is to guard
against systemic instability of the financial system. A key reason for regulating transport
industries is to ensure passenger safety. A key reason for having regulated access regimes in
telecommunications is to avoid the inefficient duplication of infrastructure components that
have “natural monopoly” characteristics.
3 Parts of this section draw on Dee, 2009.103
In services such as education and health, there are typically at least two key regulatory
objectives. One is to deal with asymmetric information. Almost by definition, the clients of
health firms or education institutions are not sufficiently trained to know whether the services
they are receiving are of high quality. In some markets, this problem is dealt with after the
event, via product liability legislation. In education and health markets, this option is typically
deemed unsatisfactory, so quality is regulated before the event – via training and perhaps
licensing/registration  requirements  for  individual  service  providers,  and  by  licensing  and
quality assurance processes for institutions.
Note, however, that regulated quality assurance processes are not the only solution to
this problem. Reputation also has a role to play. Services providers who plan to be in a market
for the long term cannot afford to offer shoddy service forever, or they will lose clients. They
have an incentive to offer quality, and to establish a reputation for doing so.
A  second  key  regulatory  objective  in  education  and  health  markets  is  to  ensure
equitable and affordable access, either for all, or for particular disadvantaged segments of
society.  Government  provision  is  the  traditional  method  of  meeting  this  objective.
Government  subsidies  to  private  institutions  and  (through  scholarships  and  the  like)  to
consumers, are also ways in which is it achieved. However, few governments can afford to
subsidize everyone. Therefore, typically there are limits on who can get government funding,
simply for budgetary reasons.
In some services sectors such as banking and insurance, there is a relative clear-cut
distinction  between  the  regulatory  instruments  used  for  legitimate  prudential  reasons  and
those that are deemed regulatory impediments to trade. The instruments commonly used for
prudential purposes include minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, liquidity
reserve ratios, possible coverage by an insolvency guarantee or deposit insurance scheme, and
a required frequency of publication of financial statements.
While there are a few grey areas, in most cases regulatory restrictions affecting trade
in  banking  and  insurance  services  can  be  dismantled  without  jeopardizing  prudential
objectives, which are achieved using other means. Of course, there is still a sequencing issue
– it would be unwise to open financial markets without adequate prudential regulation and
without adequate regulatory capacity to design and enforce it.
In health and education services, the distinction between instruments used to achieve
quality and access objectives and those deemed to be regulatory barriers to trade is less clear-
cut. Entry may be restricted to ensure that low-quality providers do not enter the market, or to
protect incumbent service providers. Similarly, access to subsidies may be limited because
governments cannot afford to subsidize everybody. Or access to subsidies may be limited in
order to disadvantage new entrants.
Achieving quality objectives in health and education will inevitably mean that there
are barriers to the entry and operation of at least some providers. However, a well-designed
quality control framework will ensure that the providers who are locked out are the genuinely104
low-quality  ones.  The  framework  can  afford  to  be  relatively  neutral  in  its  treatment  of
domestic and foreign providers, or incumbents and new entrants.
Similarly,  even  in  the  most  open  health  or  education  system,  not  all providers  or
clients will gain access to government subsidies. If the system is to not unduly constrain
trade, then this denial of subsidies should be the same for domestically owned and foreign
providers.  Ideally,  to  maximize  efficiency,  it  should  also  be  neutral  with  respect  to
incumbents and new entrants, finding some criteria other than incumbency as a mechanism to
ration the subsidies. Governments may chose not to be neutral in their treatment of access to
subsidies by domestic and foreign customers, however. For obvious reasons, they may choose
to deny the right of foreign customers to local subsidies.
Because  there  are  more  targets  than  instruments  in  health  and  education,  trade
liberalization in these services cannot be expected to lead to the compete removal of entry
barriers or restrictions on access to subsidies. What trade negotiations might be expected to
do is to ensure that they are reduced to levels that are “no more burdensome than necessary,
in the language of GATS. Where the rationale for regulation is quality assurance, then the
logical way to put this necessity test into operation is to define minimum acceptable standards
of quality that meet the needs of both sides.
To date, there has been little progress in putting a necessity test into operation for any
services within WTO. Arguably, more progress might be made within a PTA among partners
whose levels of development were not too dissimilar.
2. What to liberalize?
As noted above, trade agreements may provide useful venues to lock in certain types
of reforms, despite all the qualifications noted above. The qualifications now include the fact
that  full  liberalization  might  not  be  possible  in  situations  where  there  is  a “targets  and
instruments”  problem – too  few  regulatory  instruments  available  to  achieve  the  desired
targets.
If countries want to concentrate their trade negotiating efforts in areas that generate
the biggest gains, they need to consider five characteristics of their own regulatory barriers:
(a) The height of the trade barrier – that is, the extent to which regulatory restrictions
have raised costs or created rents;
(b) The impact of the barrier – whether the impact has been on costs or rents;
(c) The  incidence  of  the  barrier – whether  it  applies  only  to  foreign  suppliers,  or
whether it also applies to domestic operators;
(d) The size of the affected sector; and
(e) The nature of its input-output linkages to other sectors.
All these factors will affect the overall economy-wide gains from reform. Dee and
Findlay (2008) surveyed some of the evidence on the first three characteristics (more detailed105
evidence is also available in Dee, 2005).
(a) Height of the trade barrier
In some services sectors, particularly banking and telecommunications, services trade
barriers are typically much higher in developing than in developed countries. In most cases,
the remaining barriers in the developed world are low or negligible.
In  other  services  sectors,  particularly  the  professions,  the  distribution  sector
(wholesale and retail trade) and electricity generation, the barriers still tend to be higher in the
developing than the developed countries, but the barriers in the latter countries are often non-
trivial.  Particular  developed  countries  have  maintained  quite  high  barriers  to  entry  and
operations in the professions, particularly the accounting and legal professions. Some have
maintained  significant  restrictions  on  the  operations  of  large  wholesale  and  retail  chains,
either directly or through restrictions on such things as zoning and hours of operation, in
order to protect local “Mom and Pop” stores. Trade barriers  are  also non-trivial in those
developed  countries  that  have  yet  to  open  their  electricity  generation  sectors  fully  to
competition.
In some sectors, barriers are as high in the developed as in the developing world. On
bilateral  air  transport  routes  still  governed  by  traditional  bilateral  air  services  agreements
rather than open skies agreements, the restrictions are as high for developed as for developing
countries.
Finally, for a few services sectors, the barriers are higher in at least some developed
countries than in some developing countries. Maritime is a prime example. The United States
maintains stringent cabotage restrictions, exempts liner shipping conferences from the normal
disciplines of competition policy and maintains a range of other restrictions, including on
hiring foreign crews and on shipping non-commercial cargoes. Its trade barriers in maritime
have been estimated to be higher than in Latin America and most of Asia (McGuire, Schuele
and Smith, 2000).
(b) Impact of the trade barrier
Whether barriers create  rents or add to resource costs is currently severely under-
researched.  Some  of  the  available  empirical  evidence  and a  priori  argument  on  this  was
summarized above. In some cases, the empirical evidence is suggestive, but not conclusive,
because  only  one  performance  measure has  been  used.  In  other  cases,  a  price  impact  is
estimated,  and  then  it  is  simply  asserted  whether  the  effect  operates  through  price-cost
margins or through real resource costs. This is a key area where more thorough empirical
research is needed.
(c) Incidence of the trade barrier
There is a great deal of variability among both developed and developing countries in
whether  barriers  discriminate  against  foreign  services  providers,  or  also  affect  domestic106
operators.
In particular sectors, some developing countries maintain high barriers that are also
strongly discriminatory against foreign operators – for example, banking in Malaysia and
telecommunications  in Thailand.  In  other  sectors,  barriers  are  lower  but  also  strongly
discriminatory – for example, banking in Thailand. In other countries, barriers tend to be both
lower and less discriminatory – for example, the banking and telecommunications sectors in
the Russian Federation, the Baltic countries and much of south-eastern Europe.
In  the  developed  world,  trade  barriers  in  banking  and  telecommunications  are
sufficiently low on average that any margin of discrimination is also trivial. At the other
extreme, barriers in maritime are both high and discriminatory. In Europe, the trade barriers
in engineering services tend to be non-discriminatory, while those in legal services can be
highly discriminatory.
The one generalization that can be made is that when there are significant barriers to
foreign supply, there are typically also non-trivial barriers to domestic supply. It is very rare
to  have  a  significant  barrier  to  foreign  entry  and/or  operations  with  no  barrier  affecting
domestic new entrants.
(d) Size of the affected sector
The size of the affected sector is sufficiently important that it can sometimes dominate
the height of the barrier. In an economy such as Indonesia, for example, barriers to trade in
telecommunications services are higher than those in the distribution sector (i.e., wholesale
and  retail  trade) while  the  height  of  the  barrier  in  distribution  is,  in  fact,  quite  modest.
However, the distribution sector is bigger, accounting for around 15 per cent of the economy.
Primarily because of this, the estimated gains from further reform in distribution are bigger
than those in telecommunications, even after taking into account the potential productivity
boost that could come from greater business-to-business e-commerce (Dee, 2008).
(e) Intersectoral linkages
Finally,  a  key  consideration  is  which  services  sectors  have  strong  intersectoral
linkages to the sectors where a country’s ultimate comparative advantage lays. Ghani (2009)
draws  a  distinction  between  East  Asia,  where  the  ultimate  comparative  advantage  is  in
manufactures, and South Asia, where the ultimate comparative advantage is in services itself
(e.g., both ICT services and ICT-enabled services such as back-office professional services).
The services that have strong intersectoral linkages with manufacturing are those such
as transport, logistics and energy services. The services that have strong intersectoral linkages
to services are most other services. Therefore, East Asia will get relatively large economy-
wide gains from liberalizing and improving productivity in transport, logistics and energy
(this tends to be confirmed in empirical studies such as Dee, 2008). South Asia will record
relatively large economy-wide gains from liberalizing and improving productivity in most
services sectors.107
3. Sectoral priorities: Principles of piecemeal reform
One important principle for piecemeal reform of services – the services equivalent of
the “top down” principle – is to look for sectors where trade barriers tend to add to costs.
These are typically not the areas where regulatory barriers have created artificial barriers to
entry (although rents can still be converted to real resource costs in a number of ways, for
example, by being capitalized into the cost of land). Instead, they tend to be areas where
regulations create unnecessary procedures and red tape.
In the East Asian region, these services sectors also happen to be sectors with strong
intersectoral  linkages  to  manufacturing.  Thus,  the  sectoral  priorities  in East  Asia  should
include  the  various  links  in  the  logistics  chain – customs,  transport  (road,  rail,  air  and
maritime), distribution and telecommunications – which is vital for e-commerce. They should
also  include  energy  services,  particularly  electricity,  where  poorly  designed  domestic
regulation can add to costs. They should also include some less obvious backbone services,
such as legal and accounting services, where at least some regulatory restrictions also add to
costs.
At least some of these services involve significant physical infrastructure, and it is
also well-recognized that the availability of infrastructure is also critical to economic growth.
Thus, regulatory reforms that can improve the investment climate in these areas will have a
doubly  beneficial  impact – increasing  the  resources  available  as  well  as  improving  the
productivity of the resources that are employed.
In South Asia, services trade reforms do not need to be quite so targeted because of
the relatively dense intersectoral linkages within the services area. However, the transport and
distribution sectors are areas where regulatory trade barriers in South Asia are high, and are
likely to be adding unnecessarily to cost structures.
C. Conclusion
A  second  key  principle  for  piecemeal  reform of  services – arguably  even  more
important than the first – is to look more broadly than just removing discrimination against
foreign providers. This means that trade negotiators and trade ministers should not “let the tail
wag the dog”. This means that:
(a) They should not pursue services trade for its own sake, but rather define their
country’s  overall  domestic  reform  objectives  clearly  and  let  the  trade  policy
initiatives follow on naturally;
(b) They should not get hung up on “negotiating coinage;” and
(c) They should worry primarily about productivity in services and let trade look after
itself.108
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